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ARCHITECTURE: 
PROJECTIVE, CRITICAL 
OR CRAFT?
Certain notions seem to have been returning throughout the architecture debates 
of the past five years, including most notably the ‘post-critical’, the ‘projective’, 
and the ‘post-theoretical’. These phrases have been used alternately to delineate 
a new direction in architectural thinking, or as an opposition to ambiguous inter-
pretations of the ‘critical’. Insofar as it can be addressed as a coherent whole, the 
current debate on ‘post-critical’ and ‘projective’ architecture often treats the two 
notions as interchangeable despite their distinctions. 
This conflation has made it perhaps too easy to dismiss both the projective 
and the post-critical, simply because there is a strong faith in a generic sense of 
critical perception that seems crucial to the practice of architecture. At the same 
time this generalized critical view has become conflated with a much more insidi-
ous form of criticality that has misdirected our attention from the issues at hand. 
Simply dismissing the notion of the projective does not do it justice; there is some 
value in its rethinking of the discourse, and might even be emblematic for a spe-
cific issue confronting architecture (in practice and in discourse) today. Therefore 
this paper begins quite simply by teasing out what I think is still of value in the 
projective debate. I will hold primarily to the term ‘projective’, as there is some-
thing distinct about the projective that appears to suggest a more productive ori-
entation towards architecture and its discourse. Where the ‘post-critical’ largely 
appears to dismiss the previous paradigm of the so-called ‘critical’, the projective 
attempts to incorporate criticality and re-inscribe it directly within the disciplin-
ary boundaries of architecture.
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The notion of criticality that has become central in the last half of the twenti-
eth century derives from a neo-Marxist discourse that presumes the presence of a 
false consciousness. The distinction is made between affirmation and negation—
to operate within existing conditions without critiquing (in the grand sense) its 
conditions places one in the affirmative camp, while self-consciously manipulat-
ing existing codes in order to evoke a consciousness of existing preconceptions is 
the desirable outcome of an artistic endeavor: the artist (or the architect) is given 
a Nietzschean position of ‘lifting the veil’ of an illusory reality. In most cases, this 
revolves around societal conditions: revealing oppressions and preconceptions 
that perpetuate our unequal divisions of power and affluence, in particular in the 
contemporary conditions of late capitalism, which seem to somehow incorporate 
every form of critique that is presented.
Now in a generic sense, the desire to be critical is almost a truism. It seems 
almost trivial to note that most architects would at least presume a critical (re-
flective, thinking, considered) position in the world. That they would typically not 
want to be seen as purely affirmative of the conditions they operate under, and 
that they would typically consider their contribution to be somehow of value to 
the world, whether this is in terms of ‘revealing’ an as yet unconsidered alterna-
tive, or rather offering an unforeseen space of quietude, or rather mirroring the 
cultural fabric we operate within. Any of these positions requires some form of 
thought and perception that goes beyond simple replication of the cultural condi-
tions the architect operates within.
At the same time, there is a more specific sense of criticality that the ‘projec-
tive’ as put forward by Robert Somol and Sarah Whiting responds to. It is this 
response that is also embedded in the slew of various terms that position them-
selves as beyond, after, or in opposition to the critical in architecture. In particu-
lar, the conflation between the projective and the post-critical has hit a raw nerve. 
This has turned the debate towards an unproductive direction in which the pro-
tagonists argue semantics more than the issue at hand. They’re easily dismissed 
as too smooth, too easy, they’re either seen as too cynical or too naïve. 
However, I believe there is a need for something like the projective. It address-
es a specific problem with the notion of the critical that should be considered. In 
first instance, I will use the ‘critical’ as a general term to describe the incorpora-
tion of the neo-Marxist criticality: the general sense that the term projective was 
aimed at.1 The problems with the critical can be taken as a number of general 
1  This is the critical as used by Theodor Adorno, but the role of criticism became prominent 
with Manfredo Tafuri’s “L’Architecture dans le Boudoir: The Language of Criticism and the Criti-
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ones within (at least) the transatlantic debate on architecture.2 Within this gen-
eral identification of problems, there are also specific cultural distinctions that 
should not be discounted, which will be briefly noted below. First, critical theory 
in general and its role in architecture has somehow deflected our attention from 
the architectural object by focusing (almost exclusively) on the underlying con-
ditions that form the object, such as power structures, societal prejudice, and 
dominant discourse. In the end, this deflection of attention has become so strong 
that the architectural object is reduced to the illustration of the theoretical lens 
through which it is viewed. The problem with this approach was sensed as early 
as the mid-90s, when various ideas were introduced that attempted to transcend 
traditional categories, most incorporating some notion of a pragmatic approach 
such as ‘pragmatic idealism’. These new ‘sensibilities’ somehow responded to 
the idea that the critical theories employed in the architecture discourse were no 
longer sufficient to help us understand and work within the increasingly complex 
reality we resided in. 
The criticism addressed to the pragmatic approach is typically directed at its 
acceptance of reality as it is. Again this does not do justice to the complex posi-
tion taken up by architects. Have they, in the wake of a ‘post-critical’ era, become 
nothing but affirmative? Did they dive into reality and reject any form of critical-
ity? This seems unlikely, because architects almost by definition must envision a 
‘better world’. You cannot put a pen to paper unless you have some idea that what 
you are about to make is ‘better’, whether that means your building or urban plan 
is more appropriate, more subtle, more interesting, more engaging, more pro-
vocative or more delicately proportioned, than what you are about to erase or add 
to (transform). And it’s in this position that we can begin to make a distinction 
between the projective and the post-critical. The projective and the post-critical 
are typically dismissed because they are after or beyond the critical (therefore 
they are not critical). This seems a little unfair to the potential of the projective 
cism of Language,” Oppositions 3 (1974). The edition in K. Michael Hays, ed.: Architecture 
Theory since 1968 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998, pp. 146 – 173) includes an introduction that 
notes that “criticism must violate and pass through the object of such an architecture to the sys-
tem that gives the object’s meaning” (p. 146, my italics). This role of critical theory is the cen-
tral one addressed by the notion of the ‘projective’, and it can be approached, as it is by Bruno 
Latour, as a general strategy of revealing undisclosed preconceptions throughout the twentieth 
century.
2  As the debate circling around specific reconsiderations of criticality and architecture has 
taken place primarily in transatlantic academic circles, I will remain within these boundaries. 
This is not to discount any contributions from elsewhere, but simply to focus on the center of the 
debate.
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however: as a word, it was a clever choice. It incorporated the notion of the ‘proj-
ect’ as fundamental to architectural production. It avoided the limitations of fram-
ing something as a ‘post’ development, therefore remaining also slightly off-center 
from the traditional discourse. The article by Somol and Whiting that launched 
this might have been imperfect as a well-researched scholarly position, but it of-
fered nevertheless a number of provocative suggestions that held some appeal. 
They clearly sensed something in the air—something that is only now beginning 
to be framed in a coherent fashion, a group of ideas that seem to transcend a 
merely individual intervention.3 
In essence, Somol and Whiting argued that there is something so specific 
about the architectural project, about making something, about envisioning some-
thing new, that we must endeavor to understand it as fundamental to what we do 
as architects. And if we understand it in this way, we might have a little opening 
(not a lot, but just enough) to move beyond what critical theory has enforced, 
which is to remain within an oppositional framework between creation and cri-
tique. We either critique the world (remove ourselves from it as agents) or we 
build a utopia. But there somehow was no room left in between these categories 
to maneuver within the very complicated world we have. Neither in theory nor in 
practice does this do justice to the many layers of problems architecture is re-
quired to address, nor does it acknowledge the fact that sometimes, a project may 
simply have to find the most satisfying solution to multiple wishes that are mutu-
ally exclusive. 
The problems with critique as such, to the extent that they have been dis-
cussed in the architecture debate, are best addressed by Bruno Latour’s article 
from 2004, ‘Why has critique run out of steam?’.4 This article introduces this prob-
3  Robert Somol and Sarah Whiting: “Notes around the Doppler Effect and Other Moods of 
Modernism,” Perspecta 33 (2002), pp. 72 – 77. One could even argue (and indeed the authors 
themselves have remarked) that this was a relatively small article, meant to provoke a little, but 
certainly not meant as the sledgehammer it was taken for. In some sense, the importance of the 
article is not in the depth of its literal argument, but in the power of its reception and reiterations 
throughout a transatlantic debate. At the very least, we can take this to indicate that its provoca-
tions somehow hit a nerve, one that merits further exploration.
4  Bruno Latour: “Why has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of 
Concern,” Critical Inquiry 30, 2 (Winter 2004), pp. 225 – 48. See also the paper of Rixt Hoeks-
tra elsewhere in these proceedings. She not only gives a good introduction on the Frankfurter 
Schule, but also noted that, contrary to Adorno’s expectations, the generation of 1968 enjoyed 
their pop music, got immersed, and became critical. This is at odds with the principles of critique 
according to the Frankfurter Schule, which presumes a strong division between artistic produc-
tion and (derivative and therefore uncritical) mass production. Immersion is seen as excluding 
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lem of critical research about opinions and subjective filters, about understand-
ings of the world, and not about facts. Latour has as a subtitle for his article: 
‘from matters of fact to matters of concern.’ The crux of the article is encapsulat-
ed in a relatively simple diagram that shows the relation between the subject and 
the object. The critic places himself outside of this. There is a subject in this dia-
gram (as we are all subjects), who believes that the object he values is somehow 
inherently valuable because of the qualities of the object itself. Now in the mecha-
nisms of critique, the critic is the one who reveals the falseness of this view: he 
notes that the object is no more than a blank screen on which the subject projects 
his own interests and values. It is the attribution of values to this object that 
makes it valuable: this is the empowerment of the subject. At that point, when the 
subject begins to realize that this involves a sense of empowerment, of autonomy 
—of agency to create his own world, the critic again steps in and disabuses him 
of this idea. The critic tells him that he is not a free agent able to autonomously 
determine his actions, but is rather guided and determined by invisible forces and 
societal preconditions. The subject is now at the mercy of upbringing, social class, 
ethnicity and gender. These forces will determine your every move. This puts you 
in a double bind: you are neither powerful nor powerless. Or, to recall Rem Kool-
haas’ characterizaton of architecture, you are both impotent and omnipotent.5 
There is a rather remarkable situation here though: the critic has somehow 
remained outside of this scheme.6 He has appropriated the god’s eye view (or the 
position of the evil scientist in Hilary Putnam’s Brain-in-a-Vat, or the Architect of 
the Matrix) and placed himself jenseits: beyond societal determination. The critic 
performing the critique is miraculously outside, while everyone else in the world 
is constrained within this diagram. 
the critical impulse by definition, yet this seems to deny the duality with which one can be part of 
something and reflect on it at the same time. 
5  “it [architecture] is a paradoxical mixture of power and powerlessness.” Alejandro Zaera: 
“Finding Freedoms: Conversations with Rem Koolhaas,” El Croquis 53 (1994): pp. 6– 31. Curious-
ly, his phrasing may distinguish (in a general sense) the critical theorists from the architects. A 
sense of alienation rings through in architecture’s being identified as neither powerful nor pow-
erless, while there is an undertone of liberation in the mixture of both power and powerlessness. 
It seems as if Koolhaas’ position, in its diffusion, offers the possibility of accepting conditions we 
work within while preserving some individual agency. It simultaneously relieves us of changing 
the world in its entirety, and demands that we hold ourselves accountable for our actions.
6  According to Latour, this construction is made possible by allowing the two different steps 
(from all-powerful to omnipotent) to be based on two different subjects and objects. This aspect 
of the argument is not central to my argument, as it is primarily the position of the critic that is 
at question here.
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This diagram is truly a remarkable feat. Even though it seems a little con-
voluted in its presentation, it very precisely indicates where the problem with 
critical theory arises: it begins from a position that is placed outside of its own 
logic. This, in the view of Latour, quickly then devolves from a useful mechanism 
into the conspiracy theories that can be used to defuse truly important (politi-
cal) arguments.7 Does Latour thus refute critique entirely? No, but what he says 
is that we have committed the greatest intellectual crime by using the tools of a 
previous era to address the problems of this one. Critical theory was crucial in 
the post-war era, in the 1950s and 1960s, to make us conscious of underlying con-
ditions and preconceptions that were invisibly determining our actions. And yet, 
if we cannot presume, 30 years down the road, a minimal level of critical aware-
ness, we cannot have this debate to begin with. So I would suggest that we begin 
with a presumption of some (fraction of) wisdom gained within those 30 years, of 
some awareness that apparently objective arguments are sometimes colored by 
their ideological agendas. If we can presume this minimal level of awareness (and 
suspicion of apparent objectivity), then maybe we can also acknowledge that we 
can simply try to formulate potential pitfalls, but need to primarily remain aware 
every step of the way. We can proposed that we need to recalibrate our own ideas 
in response to the changes in the world around us. Then perhaps we can take a 
closer look at the presumptions we are operating within that keep us trapped in 
replicating the same mechanisms, despite the changes in our world.
Cultural misconceptions: different translations of critical
As an illustration of the benefits of critical theory that we can perhaps consider 
incorporated in our discourse today, we can briefly examine some cultural distinc-
tions in how ‘the critical’ as a general term is approached. This requires both an 
awareness of the debate as a general (transatlantic) issue, as well as the ability 
to see the specific cultural inflections that can inform us about underlying suppo-
sitions that color the debate. 
The post-critical debate arose out of the U.S. This was mainly a response to 
the work of Eisenman and his interpretation of Tafuri’s ideas on autonomy in 
7  Latour notes that this became truly apparent to him when, on the issue of global warming, a 
Republican politician used the tools of critical theory against the commonly held position of sci-
entists that man-made pollutants were the cause. He suggests that the lack of scientific certainty, 
the fact that the evidence is not complete, should remain central in the media. Latour notes his 
concern that his own work in emphasizing the lack of scientific certainty (originally intende to 
emancipate the public) is now used to prevent action being undertaken against the urgent prob-
lem of global warming. Bruno Latour, see note 4. 
PR
O
JE
C
T
IV
E
 A
N
D
 C
R
IT
IC
A
L PR
A
C
T
IC
E
 | 3
4
5
architecture, which was premised on the inability to act in a culturally significant 
way upon society due to the already complicit nature of architectural practice.8 
In other words, architecture must recede somehow to be critical, and if it is impli-
cated, it must thus by definition not be critical. 
One of the specific traits of this American discourse, not only configured 
by the work of Eisenman but also strongly determined by the work of Michael 
Hays, is its focus on resistance to dominant ideas.9 This cultural resistance is 
based on the idea that the autonomy of architecture is determined by its abil-
ity to disengage itself from the existing structures of power and capital. In the 
work of Eisenman this is largely expressed through his attention for the internal 
mechanisms on the discourse, and the near-linguistic modulations of his designs. 
Ironically, one could argue that this work thus reinforces the separation between 
architecture as a cultural act and the institutionalized theory that informs it. This 
precisely again replicates the sense of critique Latour argues is now failing to ad-
dress contemporary conditions appropriately.
The book Intersections offers an introduction to this debate in England, which 
I would argue is more an ‘expanding’ of the historical object.10 The discourse in 
England seems to have been marked by a stronger sense of a perceived objectiv-
ity of historical work, which never really incorporated a critical view of the under-
lying conditions that form the historical object as well. In this light it makes sense 
to add critical theory to expand the historical object with additional information. 
This takes on a specific form with the explicit desire voiced by the editors to bring 
together design and criticism. It is in the separation between design and criticism 
in the intellectual history of England that criticality is perceived to fulfill a role.
8  This is a reasonably well-documented position. Besides the paper by Jane Rendell elsewhere 
in these proceedings, the Somol and Whiting article explicitly takes a position in response to 
Eisenman’s notion of autonomy, as well as the critical architecture discussed by Michael Hays in 
his article “Critical Architecture: Between Culture and Form.” Perspecta 21 (1984): pp. 14 – 29. 
For a lineage of the positions on ‘criticality’ in architecture, see in particular: George Baird: 
“Criticality and its Discontents.” Harvard Design Magazine, 21 (Fall 2004/Winter 2005). The 
problem with criticality and the way Tafuri is received particularly in American academic circles, 
see Rixt Hoekstra: “Tafuri: van tijdsgeest tot kwelgeest,” de Architect 2, Feb. 2007. pp. 16 – 19.
9  Hays, see note 8. In his introduction, he notes the idea of form as resistant and oppositional 
present in the idea of autonomous architecture.
10  Jane Rendell, Iain Borden, eds.: Intersections: Architectural Histories and Critical Theo-
ries. (London: Routledge, 2000). The introduction to the book by Iain Borden and Jane Rendell 
‘From chamber to transformer: epistemological challenges and tendencies in the intersection of 
architectural histories and critical theories’ (pp. 3 – 24) specifically addresses the conditions in 
England surrounding historical and theoretical research.
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This intellectual broadening in first instance appears unarguably interest-
ing, as it claims a role for criticism as design, and the inverse sense of design as 
criticism. Nevertheless, as this work is framed from the perspective of a (by now 
traditional) sense of critique, it simultaneously seems to limit itself to a societal 
critique. The unexpected cultural significance that might arise from an object that 
is questionable in its original inception but becomes embedded in the cultural 
consciousness of its time is difficult to identify in this type of work. 
In the Netherlands there was a strong sense of the potential of a critical 
stance to transform culture, as illustrated in the activities of groups such as the 
Provos. There was an exciting constellation of various urban revolutionaries 
(with, in retrospect, a charming form of lunacy) changing the face of our country. 
In the end, the shifts in the 1960s expanded to transform many elements of so-
ciety: schools were reformed, universities were transformed in both curriculum 
and organization, and even language was addressed. Dutch spelling was changed, 
because it was considered too complex and therefore oppressive and authoritar-
ian. Instead, the phonetic spelling became preferred as an indication of demo-
cratic equality. Therefore, the tendency in the Netherlands is primarily related to 
what can be considered the ‘krities’ appeal (spelled phonetically instead of the 
traditional ‘kritisch’). 
The ‘kritiese’ Dutch groups were oriented primarily towards the social program 
and the political agency of architecture and urban planning. One of the most promi-
nent features of this period is the rise in participatory planning, and the desire to 
give every (future) inhabitant a voice in the process of urban transformation. This 
deflected attention for the architectural object as such in favor of the underlying 
social and political processes. This implied that the architectural object must mani-
fest no less, but also no more than just social program and political intent. Its addi-
tional formal, symbolic and cultural implications were essentially ignored. 
I offer these distinctions not as a comprehensive history of the influence of 
criticality, but rather to indicate that in the global debate on notions of ‘projective’ 
and ‘post-critical’, specific modulations arise from the invisible presumptions that 
arise out of our own cultural history. It is the discourse of critical theory that has 
helped us understand how our cultural baggage informs the way we approach 
this issue to begin with. At the same time, there is an obvious question remaining 
somewhat hidden under the surface of these different interpretations of criticality. 
Why is architecture so enamored with critique? What has critical theory brought 
to architecture, and is it still useful as a strategy today? These are precisely the 
questions Latour raises in the more general role of critique, and his conclusion is 
that critique was central to a rethinking of many of our cultural preconceptions 
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at a specific moment in time. However, he also suggests that this is no longer the 
case. Is this true for architecture as well? Are we finished with critical theory’s 
deconstruction of the intricate webs of power relations and how these enforced 
their own legitimacy by various means? Are we through with identifying the op-
pressive elements in dominant styles? Or is the core of the projective debate 
about a different form of understanding that builds on this history of critique? 
Could we perhaps treat the notion of the projective as a development that reveals 
the shortcomings of criticality rather than undermining it entirely?  
Underlying mechanisms
What the projective debate above all reveals is that certain mechanisms are still 
in operation that the discourse of criticality had hoped to undermine. First and 
foremost, the notion that critique is meant to reveal a false consciousness places 
the architectural project in a strange position: it is not an object in its own right, 
but an illustration of the mechanisms that shape it. In an inversion of the tradi-
tional all-powerful architect, this supposition removes the possibility of agency 
from the object. Unless, of course, the architecture is somehow critical: by having 
placed itself outside dominant culture, it becomes a powerful mode of revealing 
our undisclosed preconceptions. 
This position on architecture continues to build on what Herbert Gans identi-
fied in the 1960s as ‘physical determinism’. The modernist assumption that the 
use and reception of a building was more or less in line with their projections 
equates the physical gesture and the social response. The machine à habiter 
will not only appeal to the rational faculties of its inhabitant, it will induce them. 
Ostensibly, the notion of criticality undermines this simplistic rendering of cul-
tural production by introducing many of the complex factors that shape it. By 
understanding such issues as budget, hierarchy, societal convention, gender bias, 
our understanding of an apparently clear project becomes more layered and com-
prehensive. These benefits must be acknowledged. At the same time, as criticality 
became more of a goal than an instrument, it shifted the focus from the richness 
(and internal conflicts) of the object to the underlying mechanisms. By giving pri-
macy to underlying mechanisms, the surrounding conditions may have gained in 
clarity and presence, but the object itself began to disappear until it was no more 
than illustration of outside forces. This reinforces the notion of physical determin-
ism insofar as it supports a singular reading: the critical building will induce criti-
cal consciousness.11
11  In the conclusion to his article, Hays himself suggests that the counterpoint to the simpli-
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Above all, rather than accepting the idea that the spirit of criticality may also 
mean discarding the tools we have come to take as central to architecture, the 
critical has repositioned itself as a universal form of tactical resistance. It demon-
strates the understanding we have of cultural output: that it must raise political 
awareness (or preferably, politically intervene), that architecture will preempt a 
revolution Whether we look back at Le Corbusier’s ‘architecture où revolution’ 
or Guy Debord’s appeal to ‘sous les pavés, la plage’, there is a presumption that 
architecture has a significant (and to them perhaps even predictable) effect on 
society. 
Criticality does presume that only resistant forms of cultural production are 
significant, for all other forms fall in the category of ‘culture’ described by Hays: 
the (mere) illustration of societal conditions. At the same time, one could also ar-
gue that some ‘embedded’ forms of architecture reveal other mechanisms that are 
culturally significant. A large generation gap becomes visible in this lineage of the 
American discourse on criticality: the mutually exclusive positioning of critical 
architecture as opposed to affirmative architecture seems to deny the very same 
multiple readings that the postmodern discourse of Eisenman, Hays, and many 
others explicitly acknowledges as a turning point in contemporary architecture. 
This is precisely the point that a contemporary reading of architectural practice 
may offer new insights: more fluid positions, availing themselves of ‘small ide-
ologies’ that incorporate a strong belief system yet are not presumed to imply a 
totalizing position, and deeply embedded within the actual process of making, by 
their very nature both affirm and undermine our preconceptions.
In the end, this is where architecture has been short-changed by criticality. 
Latour’s assertion that critique has taken us outside of the object by refusing to 
let us study the object itself, but only our projections onto or the underlying condi-
tions that form it, illustrates the problem for architecture. At that point, what do 
you do with your building? It can never become more than a concrete manifesta-
tion of the conditions that you have hopelessly surrendered to. What also follows 
fied treatment of architecture’s qualities resides in a ‘resistant authority’, which neither simply 
reflects culture nor embraces a purely formal system. See note 8, p. 27. While Somol and Whit-
ing respectfully reference his precision in revealing the necessary dialectic between autonomy 
and engagement, their arrows are aimed at the general project of critical architecture and its 
continuing presence in the architecture debate. “The criticality of Hays and Eisenman maintains 
the oppositional or dialectical framework in the work of their mentors and predecessors, while 
simultaneously trying to short-circuit or blur their terms.” Robert Somol and Sarah Whiting: 
“Notes around the Doppler Effect and Other Moods of Modernism,” Perspecta 33 (2002): p. 73.
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from this is the notion that a work of architecture can never be properly under-
stood until the social and political context is understood. 
I think this forms the core question that gave rise to this debate on the projec-
tive. What can architecture do, and what is its scope of action? Can we hope only 
to reveal the conditions set upon architecture, or can we also intervene in ‘real-
ity’? Do we have any form of ‘agency’ as architects? Or are we by definition deter-
mined by existing societal conditions and is it impossible to transcend the tempo-
rary significance of our own context? The presumptions of a critical architecture 
are also founded on the notion that if we somehow reveal this false consciousness 
(the intent of Ideologiekritik), people will automatically respond by behaving 
otherwise. It rests on the modernist idea of physical determinism: if we somehow 
create a revolutionary architecture, its occupants will transform accordingly: they 
will become revolutionary beings. In architecture, envisioning utopia includes not 
only a social but also a physical component: the ideal reality must be given tan-
gible form. Our agency is somehow always projected at the physical realization 
of that utopian vision: if it is given a certain form, the social utopia will naturally 
follow.
The result of this position is a denial of the complexity of the relationship be-
tween our building and society. Can we not only envision, but literally build a new 
society? Can we socially engineer a society through critical architecture? If criti-
cal architecture is meant to reveal a false consciousness, then who holds the key 
to ‘reality’? Does that mean that the enlightened critic needs to tell people how 
to be critical, and more importantly to what end? This appears to be the weak-
ness of this neo-Marxist, critical discourse. At some point, I am not only told to 
be critical, but also how to be critical. And at that point, does critique not defeat 
its own purpose? Aren’t the critics telling me that they have remained outside of 
the destructive influence of the system and I haven’t seen the light? Aren’t they 
telling me to take the red pill and exit the Matrix, to learn the truth about it? This 
externalized position of the critic continues to inform the debate today, and it 
seems difficult to envision a more embedded position that maintains some level of 
autonomy, that can envision an ideal while remaining implicated in reality.
Ways forward?
This seems to be precisely the problem that Somol and Whiting intended to ad-
dress: they suggest that there is some form of ‘agency’ in architecture that can 
elude the choice between physical determinism or impotence. The strength of 
their article is that they went back to architecture. They may have done this in 
a slightly diffuse way, calling in the Doppler effect, Robert Mitchum’s acting and 
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McLuhan’s ideas on hot and cool media. Nevertheless, all of this was directed at 
and centered on the architectural object, and the idea that we might actually have 
a discipline that we can talk about. Not as some kind of mystical congealing of 
societal figures, but something that we can talk about as a discipline and as an 
expertise. 
Now this is dangerous territory, because everyone with half a critical bone 
in their body will say: when you bring in the notion of expertise, do you not re-
introduce the oppressive figure of authority that critical theory had taught us to 
question? Do you not deny the voice of everyone who does not share this level of 
expertise? Does the expert then determine our reality, taking away our freedom 
of speech, our freedom of thought? Yet it seems there is a simple way out of this 
dilemma, which resides precisely in a crucial aspect of architecture: making the 
building, be it in drawings, models, or concrete. The importance of making is the 
central theme in a recent book by Richard Sennett, The Craftsman (2008). 
The notion of the ‘craftsman’ is typically associated with a pre-industrial 
sense of craft, and is therefore deemed inappropriate to what we might envision 
as the role of architecture in contemporary society. However, Sennett expands 
the notion of craft. He does not limit himself to making with the hands: he incor-
porates such ‘crafts’ as computer programming, parenting, and other forms of 
expertise not aligned with a traditional understanding of craft. Most importantly, 
Sennett argues against a more traditional opposition between intellectual produc-
tion and craftsmanship, putting forward the idea that making is not unthinking, 
that it in fact incorporates thinking.12 He includes a vast range of crafts and 
forms of expertise, because he is not looking specifically at a single form of craft 
or the object that results form it, but rather at what the mechanisms are by which 
these people create an expertise and through which they are able to speak about 
it in a more accurate or specific way. His notion of craft is based on an idea of 
expertise combined with (reflective) practice, requiring about ten thousand hours 
to lay claim to a level of ‘craftsmanship’ or ‘ expertise’. Sennett’s description of 
craftsmanship also presumes a distinction in quality, which immediately raises 
the critical question of who determines the standards of quality? Are we going to 
relegate our hard-earned sense of social justice to a dusty corner of ideals and 
allow ourselves to be told that we simply cannot judge? Yet this also runs counter 
to what Sennett suggests: he also indicates that the layman can appreciate a well-
12  This is not unrelated to the attention Michael Speaks gives to ‘design intelligence’: a form of 
thinking that arises out o the process of making. It is also akin to the work of Bruno Latour in 
‘Give me a gun and I’ll make architecture move’. 
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executed work. More importantly, he suggests that there is a basic level at which 
all of us can learn to do something well: that talent is simply one aspect of the 
equation that leads to expertise.13
Sennett proposes that practice does make perfect, because it is the continuing 
practice that engages with specific problems, that allows for progress. Not only 
must one practice, but one must be willing to acknowledge mistakes and learn 
from them. To learn from mistakes requires a sense of reflection that is able not 
only to discern mistakes but also to conceive of how to correct them. The many 
hours of practice and reflection lead to a moment where the activity is no longer 
part of your conscious mode, but has become literally embodied: it resides in the 
fingers, in the voice, in the corporeal movements that make up the activity. Once 
it is embodied, the problems to be engaged can become more advanced, and the 
need for correcting mistakes progresses to the question of how to improve per-
formance. One could also say, one needs to intimately know the rules in order to 
break them. In Sennett’s example on music, it is when you have incorporated the 
expertise of hitting a note precisely and perfectly every time, you can begin to 
question the existing standards.14
This focus on the process of making reveals insights that may not become 
visible when only thinking through a problem. Architecture with its three dimen-
sions and many contextual constraints may even be more susceptible to the need 
for making. It encompasses a specificity in conditions such as the site, light, 
space, context, regulations, client, and local traditions. At the same time, all these 
contextual constraints as well as the internal qualities of the discipline imply the 
inverse: once realized, the architectural object may not have the same effect as 
originally conceived, therefore it also needs to be reviewed and rethought. More-
over, once built, the architectural object becomes part of the everyday fabric, and 
as time passes it may be reinscribed with new ideas. 
It seems that the idea of an incorporated expertise might allow us to redirect 
the debate on architecture and its ‘critical’ or ‘projective’ role, without having to 
take recourse to the positions on autonomy and criticality. On the one hand, archi-
tecture may be said to have a level of autonomy: the work of the architect is not 
entirely determined by his client, by societal conditions, or by existing standards. 
At the same time, it is obvious that its autonomy is limited: without a client there 
is no commission, thus no building, no presence, no ‘agency’. It is dependent: you 
13  Chapter 10, on quality.
14  Rendell suggests that it is crucial above all to question existing standards. I argue that we 
need to know them well, to be able to comply with them first, in order to question them.
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are not going to build a World Trade Center if you cannot find your client. You are 
dependent on a client, on regulations, on context. And yet there is something the 
architect can do that the client cannot, which is to put that building together. The 
architect can ensure the infrastructure is solid, is well-organized, that the spaces 
fulfill their functional or symbolic requirements. The architect can ensure that 
the building as a whole is well-constructed, and that its spaces are ‘good’. And 
this is what our discussion should revolve around: what are those good spaces? 
Are they related to what has gone on inside? Are they big, small, comfortable, 
expansive? Related to a style of the times, to its function, to a form of representa-
tion or rather a conceptual composition? These are more fruitful directions for 
debate now: let us take our insights from the past 40 years and bring them back 
to architecture itself. Let us understand the limitations of working for a corporate 
client, yet look at the building as a composite of many opposing influences, from 
architectural experience to cultural significance, from economic efficiency to ur-
ban regulations. How are these buildings designed? How do they respond to the 
surrounding public space? 
My resistance to the by now traditional understanding of agency is that it is 
always reflected through a (class-oriented) sense of human and societal agency. 
We must always talk about the political lines, the people in the building, the pro-
gram. There is at the same time, also an object to discuss, which often remains 
hidden: the building has a presence, which sometimes outlasts the time it was 
designed and constructed for. It might even be said to have an active role in the 
world: it is not only present, but used, looked at, experienced. It will demand 
engagement or intimidate its users, it will fade into its context or stand out. You 
can pretend to ignore its presence as an object, but that denies the complexity of 
cultural significance: each individual may receive it differently, yet there is also 
a general sense of symbolic value that is culturally biased. Rather than treat the 
building as a naturalized expression of social agency, why can we not talk about 
politics as being inscribed in the building? Why could we not presume that an ar-
chitect will relate to his world, his culture, his society as an architect and not as a 
politician? This does not require us blinding ourselves to societal constraints and 
political conditions. This requires us to expand our view rather than compress it, 
but at the same time to keep it centered on what is most relevant to the questions 
at hand.
Most architects hold strong views on societal issues. Many architects enter 
into dialogue with their clients, questioning their wishes, probing the boundaries 
of the project brief. My experience of architectural practices is that they have a 
very strong sense of what they can contribute to the world. Yet their propositions 
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are often more humble than those of their predecessors. Raised on the incongru-
ence between the promise of the spectacle and the reality of the silent majorities, 
they do not presume to design an ideal society with their buildings, but rather 
hope to offer something specific – a useful building, a playful building, a provoca-
tion or a quietly grounded space. This generation may respond to more or less 
universal or global conditions, but does not presume the universal applicability 
of their own work. Their improvements to the spaces of the city are oriented not 
towards a social utopia but towards a concrete and specific aim, which may nev-
ertheless appeal to an ideal. This comprises a small step forward, in acknowledg-
ing that architecture is not all-powerful, but does have something to contribute, 
and that which it has to contribute is located precisely within the thing itself.
 There is a role for critics in looking very carefully and rethinking the vocabu-
lary we utilize to understand works of architecture. This requires an approach 
that encompasses a critical view perhaps, but more than anything a deep appre-
ciation of the architectural project in all its finesses, from critique to exquisite 
solution for a specific problem, from cultural significance to the role of composi-
tion. For architects, there may well be something to be gained by making their 
considerations on standards of quality, their goals and the instruments used to 
attain them, explicit. Rather than speculating on brave new worlds, why should 
we not discuss very clearly the means and ends of each project? It also requires a 
certain humility of architecture: to acknowledge that in its bravoure of proposing 
as yet unimagined architectural propositions, that it is by nature also limited and 
constrained. However, these constraints could be taken as productive rather than 
limiting. It is a matter of standing within the discipline and identifying its poten-
tial, rather than holding it accountable from without.
In this sense, I would argue that Sennett offers an initial venture into a form of 
architecture production (ideas and realized) that might take into account not an 
ahistorical ‘essential’ view of objects, but that rather understands the complexity 
of contemporary conditions as inscribed in the object. 
